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Abstract
This paper first shows that the popular axiomatic systems proposed
by Nute for Lewis’ conditional logics are not equivalent to Lewis’ original
systems. In particular, the axiom CA which is derivable in Lewis’ systems
is not derivable in Nute’s systems. Then the paper proposes a new set
of axiomatizations for Lewis’ conditional logics, without using CSO, or
RCEA, or the rule of interchange of logical equivalents. Instead, the new
axiomatizations adopt two axioms which correspond to cautious mono-
tonicity and cautious cut in nonmonotonic logics, respectively. Finally,
the paper gives a simple resolution to a puzzle about the controversial
axiom of simplification of disjunctive antecedents, using a long neglected
axiom in one of Lewis’ systems for conditional logics.
Keywords: conditional logic, axiomatization, simplification of dis-
junctive antecedents, nonmonotonic logic
1 Introduction
Lewis proposed two conditional logics, denoted by V and VC, respectively.
Each of them has three different axiomatizations in the literature. Two were
proposed by Lewis himself, one in (Lewis, 1971), where V and VC were named
C0 and C1, respectively, the other in (Lewis, 1973). A third formulation was
offered by Nute (1980b, 1984); Nute & Cross (2001). Lewis’ formulations have
less but some cumbersome axioms. Nute’s formulations have more but neater
axioms, making them easier to compare with other systems. Thus, Nute’s ax-
iomatizations are more popular in the literature now. When referring to Lewis’
conditional logics, often are Nute’s axiomatizations presented, for instance in
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(Arló Costa, 2014) and (Pozzato, 2010).1 I will show in this paper, however,
that Nute’s systems are not equivalent to Lewis’ original ones. In particular, the
axiom CA derivable from Lewis’ systems is not derivable from Nute’s systems.
By replacing MOD with CA in Nute’s systems, the defects can be amended.
Both Lewis’ systems in (Lewis, 1971) and Nute’s systems contain the axiom
CSO, which says that bi-conditionally implied propositions can be interchanged
with each other for antecedents. From CSO together with RCE (namely a con-
ditional from ϕ to ψ can be derived if ϕ entails ψ), the rule of interchange of
logical equivalents for antecedents (RCEA, henceforth) can be derived. Instead
of CSO, Lewis’ systems in (Lewis, 1973) contain the rule of interchange of log-
ical equivalents (RE, henceforth). I will propose some new axiomatizations for
Lewis’ logics. They contain neither CSO, nor RCEA or RE, and hence may
shed light on nonclassical conditional logics, where these axiom and rules are
invalidated. The new systems I propose indicate that it is hard to abandon
these axiom and rules in conditional logics, since they can be recovered from
other intuitive axioms.
Finally, I will show that an axiom in one of Lewis’ systems can be used
to solve a puzzle triggered by the controversial axiom of simplification of dis-
junctive antecedents (SDA, henceforth), which is intuitively valid but trivializes
conditional implication to strict implication if added to any conditional logic
with RCEA.
2 Preliminaries
For reference, I list all related axioms and rules for conditional logics in this
paper as follows:
(PC) All tautologies and derivable rules in classical logic
(ID) ϕ > ϕ
(CM) (ϕ > ψ ∧ χ)→ (ϕ > ψ) ∧ (ϕ > χ)
(CC) (ϕ > ψ) ∧ (ϕ > χ)→ (ϕ > ψ ∧ χ)
(CV) (ϕ > χ) ∧ ¬(ϕ > ¬ψ)→ (ϕ ∧ ψ > χ)
(CA) (ϕ > χ) ∧ (ψ > χ)→ (ϕ ∨ ψ > χ)
(AC) (ϕ > ψ) ∧ (ϕ > χ)→ (ϕ ∧ ψ > χ)
1In (Arló Costa, 2014), the author wrote: “...it is useful to see first that the system VC
can be axiomatized via the axioms ID, MP, MOD, CSO, CV and CS with RCEC and RCK
as rules of inference.”
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(RT) (ϕ > ψ) ∧ (ψ ∧ ϕ > χ)→ (ϕ > χ)
(CSO) (ϕ > ψ) ∧ (ψ > ϕ)→ ((ϕ > χ)↔ (ψ > χ))
(MOD) (ϕ > ¬ϕ)→ (ψ > ¬ϕ)
(DAE) (ϕ ∨ ψ > ϕ) ∨ (ϕ ∨ ψ > ψ) ∨ ((ϕ ∨ ψ > χ)↔ (ϕ > χ) ∧ (ψ > χ))
(PIE) (ϕ > ¬ψ) ∨ ((ϕ ∧ ψ > χ)↔ (ϕ > (ψ → χ)))
(CMP) (ϕ > ψ)→ (ϕ→ ψ)
(CS) ϕ ∧ ψ → (ϕ > ψ)
(SDA) (ϕ ∨ ψ > χ)→ (ϕ > χ) ∧ (ψ > χ)
(RCM)
ϕ→ ψ
(χ > ϕ)→ (χ > ψ)
(RCE)
ϕ→ ψ
ϕ > ψ
(RCN)
ψ
ϕ > ψ
(RCK)
ψ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ψn → ψ
(ϕ > ψ1) ∧ . . . ∧ (ϕ > ψn)→ (ϕ > ψ)
(n ≥ 0)
(RCEA)
ϕ↔ ψ
(ϕ > χ)↔ (ψ > χ)
(RCEC)
ϕ↔ ψ
(χ > ϕ)↔ (χ > ψ)
(RE)
ψ ↔ ψ′
ϕ↔ ϕ[ψ/ψ′]
All the axioms and rules above had been discussed in the literature (e.g. Lewis,
1973; Nute, 1980b, 1984) before. Note that I slightly reformulate the axiom
MOD here. The standard formulation of MOD in the literature (including
Lewis’ works) is
MOD’ (¬ϕ > ϕ)→ (ψ > ϕ).
There are two reasons why I reformulate it. One is that it is this reformulation
rather than the standard one that corresponds directly to the associated model
condition of worlds selection functions, normally formulated in the literature as
follows:
(mod) f(w,ϕ) = ∅ =⇒ f(w,ψ) ∩ [ϕ] = ∅,
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where [ψ] denotes the truth set of ψ, and f is the selection function, associating
with a possible world w and a sentence ϕ a set of ϕ- worlds that are closest to w.
Rather, the standard formulation MOD’ corresponds to the following condition
instead:
(mod’) f(w,¬ϕ) = ∅ =⇒ f(w,ψ) ∩ [¬ϕ] = ∅.
Of course, if the rule RCEA or RE is available, the difference between the two
formulations is immaterial. But if one works on conditional logics without such
rules admissible, the two formulations might turn out to be very different. This
is related to my second reason for choosing the reformulation. In a proof of
the derivation of CSO from MOD’ and PIE below, I find if the reformulation
MOD is used then the rule RCEA or RE is dispensable; otherwise, such rules
are required for the derivation.
3 Amendments of Nute’s Axiomatizations
Nute’s axiomatization for V and VC are as follows2
Vn = 〈PC, ID,CM,CC,CV,MOD′,CSO;RCEC〉
VCn = 〈PC, ID,CM,CC,CV,MOD′,CSO,CMP,CS;RCEC〉.
I will show that CA is not derivable in neither of these systems. Since VCn is
the stronger one, it suffices to prove that CA is not derivable in VCn.
Proposition 1. 0VCn CA.
Proof. Let U = {0, 1, 2, 3}, A = {1, 2}, and B = {1, 3}. Define g : U × ℘(U)→
℘(U) as follows:
g(i,X) =


{1} if X = A and i = 0
{i} if i ∈ X
X otherwise
Now I verify that g satisfies the following conditions: for all i ∈ U and X,Y ∈
℘(U)
(id) g(i,X) ⊆ X
(mod) g(i,X) = ∅ =⇒ g(i, Y ) ∩X = ∅
2Nute’s original axiomatization used the rule RCK instead of the axioms CM and CC. But
to reduce inference rules to the minimum, I prefer to use these two axioms instead of the rule
RCK. It can be easily shown that they are equivalent as long as RCEC is provided.
4
(cv) g(i,X) ∩ Y 6= ∅ =⇒ g(i,X ∩ Y ) ⊆ g(i,X)
(cso) g(i,X) ⊆ Y and g(i, Y ) ⊆ X =⇒ g(i,X) = g(i, Y )
(cent) i ∈ X =⇒ g(i,X) = {i}
(id) and (cent) are obvious. (mod) holds since g(i,X) = ∅ iff X = ∅. It remains
to verify (cv) and (cso). For (cv), suppose g(i,X) ∩ Y 6= ∅. Consider the
following cases:
(1) X = A and i = 0. Then g(i,X) = {1}. Since g(i,X) ∩ Y 6= ∅, we have
1 ∈ Y . Hence X ∩ Y = X or X ∩ Y = {1}. In both cases, we have
g(i,X ∩ Y ) = g(i,X).
(2) i ∈ X . Then g(i,X) = {i}. Since g(i,X) ∩ Y 6= ∅, we have i ∈ Y . Then
i ∈ X ∩ Y . Hence g(i,X ∩ Y ) = {i} = g(i,X).
(3) X 6= A or i 6= 0, and i /∈ X . Then g(i,X) = X . Since i /∈ X , we have
i /∈ X ∩ Y . Then either g(i,X ∩ Y ) = {1} or g(i,X ∩ Y ) = X ∩ Y . If
g(i,X ∩Y ) = X ∩Y , we have g(i,X ∩Y ) ⊆ X = g(i,X). If g(i,X ∩Y ) 6=
X ∩ Y and g(i,X ∩ Y ) = {1}, by the definition of g, we have X ∩ Y = A.
Hence 1 ∈ X and g(i,X ∩ Y ) ⊆ g(i,X). .
For (cso), suppose g(i,X) ⊆ Y and g(i, Y ) ⊆ X . Consider the following cases:
(1) X = A and i = 0. Then g(i,X) = {1}. Since g(i,X) ⊆ Y , we have 1 ∈ Y .
Since g(i, Y ) ⊆ X and i /∈ X , we have Y = A or g(i, Y ) = Y ⊆ X . In
the former case, we have g(i,X) = g(i, Y ). In the latter case, we have
Y = {1}, and hence g(i, Y ) = {1} = g(i,X).
(2) i ∈ X . Then g(i,X) = {i}. Since g(i,X) ⊆ Y , we have i ∈ Y . Hence
g(i, Y ) = {i} = g(i,X).
(3) X 6= A or i 6= 0, and i /∈ X . Then g(i,X) = X . Since g(i,X) ⊆ Y , we
have X ⊆ Y . If Y = A and i = 0, then g(i, Y ) = {1}. By g(i, Y ) ⊆ X ,
we have 1 ∈ X . Then by X ⊆ Y = A, we have X = {1} or X = Y .
In both cases we have g(i,X) = g(i, Y ). If i ∈ Y , then g(i, Y ) = {i}.
Since g(i, Y ) ⊆ X , we have i ∈ X , contradicting that i /∈ X . In other
cases, we have g(i, Y ) = Y . Since g(i, Y ) ⊆ X , we have Y ⊆ X . Hence
g(i,X) = g(i, Y ).
Given a model M = (W, f, V ), the truth set of ϕ in M, denoted [ϕ]M, is induc-
tively defined as follows:
• [p]M = V (p) for p ∈ PV
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• [¬ϕ]M =W − [ϕ]M
• [ϕ ∧ ψ]M = [ϕ]M ∩ [ψ]M
• [ϕ > ψ]M = {w ∈W | f(w, [ϕ]M) ⊆ [ψ]M}
We say that ϕ is valid in F = (W, f) if for all models M based on F, [ϕ]M =W .
Let G = (U, g). By the frame conditions that G satisfies, it can be easily verified
that all axioms in VCn are valid in G, and G preserves validity for the rule
RCEC. But CA is not valid in G, since g(0, A ∪ B) = {1, 2, 3} * {1, 3} =
g(0, A) ∪ g(0, B). Therefore 0Vn CA.
Corollary 2. 0Vn CA3
Now I show that by replacing MOD′ with CA in the corresponding systems,
Nute’s axiomatizations can be amended. Let
Va = 〈PC, ID,CSO,DAE;RCK〉
Vb = 〈PC, ID,MOD′,PIE;RCK,RE〉
Vc = 〈PC, ID,CM,CC,CV,CA,CSO;RCEC〉
VCa = 〈PC, ID,CSO,DAE,CMP,CS;RCK〉
VCb = 〈PC, ID,MOD′,PIE,CMP,CS;RCK,RE〉
VCc = 〈PC, ID,CM,CC,CV,CA,CSO,CMP,CS;RCEC〉,
where Va and VCa are Lewis’ first axiomatizations of V and VC, respectively;
Vb and VCb are his second axiomatizations; Vc and VCc are amendments of
Nute’s systems forV andVC, respectively. To prove that these amendments are
equivalent to Lewis’ original systems, it suffices to prove that Vc is equivalent
to Va or Vb. For completeness, I will show that Vc is equivalent to both Va
and Vb.
Proposition 3. Vc = Va = Vb.
Proof. First, I show that Vc ⊇ Va. For simplification of proofs, I will show
first that RCM, RCE, RCN, and RCEA are derivable in Vc.
For RCM:
(1) ϕ→ ψ Assumption
3Nute also gave the axiomatization VWn = 〈PC, ID,CV,MOD′,CSO,CMP;RCEC,RCK〉
for Lewis’ system VW. So neither is CA derivable from VWn. The reason why CA is
missing from Nute’s axiomatization is not clear, since no explicit proof of completeness of
these systems was given in his writings. I guess the reason may be that CA is derivable in his
axiomatization of C2.
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(2) ϕ ∧ ψ ↔ ϕ (1), PC
(3) (χ > ϕ ∧ ψ)↔ (χ > ϕ) (2), RCEC
(4) (χ > ϕ ∧ ψ)→ (χ > ψ) CM, PC
(5) (χ > ϕ)→ (χ > ψ) (3), (4), PC
For RCE:
(1) ϕ→ ψ Assumption
(2) (ϕ > ϕ)→ (ϕ > ψ) (1), RCM
(3) ϕ > ϕ ID
(4) ϕ > ψ (2), (3), PC
For RCN:
(1) ψ Assumption
(2) ϕ→ ψ (1), PC
(3) ϕ > ψ (2), RCE
For RCEA:
(1) ϕ↔ ψ Assumption
(2) ϕ→ ψ, ψ → ϕ (1), PC
(3) ϕ > ψ, ψ > ϕ (2), RCE
(4) (ϕ > χ)↔ (ψ > χ) (3), CSO, PC
Now I prove that RCK is derivable in Vc. The case for n = 0 is just RCN. The
case for n = 1 is just RCM. It remains to prove the case for n = 2. The case for
n > 2 can be obtained similarly.
(1) ψ1 ∧ ψ2 → ψ Assumption
(2) (ϕ > ψ1 ∧ ψ2)→ (ϕ > ψ) (1), RCM
(3) (ϕ > ψ1) ∧ (ϕ > ψ2)→ (ϕ > ψ1 ∧ ψ2) CC
(4) (ϕ > ψ1) ∧ (ϕ > ψ2)→ (ϕ > ψ) (2), (3), PC
Next I prove that DAE is derivable in Vc. By CA, it suffices to prove (ϕ∨ψ >
ϕ) ∨ (ϕ ∨ ψ > ψ) ∨ ((ϕ ∨ ψ > χ)→ (ϕ > χ) ∧ (ψ > χ)).
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(1) (ϕ ∨ ψ > χ) ∧ ¬(ϕ ∨ ψ > ¬(¬ϕ ∨ ψ))→ ((ϕ ∨ ψ) ∧ (¬ϕ ∨ ψ) > χ) CV
(2) (ϕ ∨ ψ) ∧ (¬ϕ ∨ ψ)↔ ψ PC
(3) (ϕ ∨ ψ > χ) ∧ ¬(ϕ ∨ ψ > ¬(¬ϕ ∨ ψ))→ (ψ > χ) (1), (2), RCEA, PC
(4) (ϕ ∨ ψ > χ) ∧ ¬(ϕ ∨ ψ > ¬(ϕ ∨ ¬ψ))→ ((ϕ ∨ ψ) ∧ (ϕ ∨ ¬ψ) > χ) CV
(5) (ϕ ∨ ψ) ∧ (ϕ ∨ ¬ψ)↔ ϕ PC
(6) (ϕ ∨ ψ > χ) ∧ ¬(ϕ ∨ ψ > ¬(ϕ ∨ ¬ψ))→ (ϕ > χ) (4), (5), RCEA, PC
(7) ¬(¬ϕ ∨ ψ)→ ϕ PC
(8) (ϕ ∨ ψ > ¬(¬ϕ ∨ ψ))→ (ϕ ∨ ψ > ϕ) (7), RCM
(9) ¬(ϕ ∨ ψ > ϕ)→ ¬(ϕ ∨ ψ > ¬(¬ϕ ∨ ψ)) (8), PC
(10) ¬(ϕ ∨ ¬ψ)→ ψ PC
(11) (ϕ ∨ ψ > ¬(ϕ ∨ ¬ψ))→ (ϕ ∨ ψ > ψ) (10), RCM
(12) ¬(ϕ ∨ ψ > ψ)→ ¬(ϕ ∨ ψ > ¬(ϕ ∨ ¬ψ)) (11), PC
(13) ¬(ϕ ∨ ψ > ϕ) ∧ ¬(ϕ ∨ ψ > ψ) ∧ (ϕ ∨ ψ > χ)→ (ϕ > χ) ∧ (ψ > χ)(3), (6),
(9), (12), PC
(14) (ϕ ∨ ψ > ϕ) ∨ (ϕ ∨ ψ > ψ) ∨ ((ϕ ∨ ψ > χ)→ (ϕ > χ) ∧ (ψ > χ))(13), PC
This completes the proof of Vc ⊇ Va.
Now I prove Va ⊇ Vb. First I prove that RCE, RCEA, and RCEC are
derivable in Va.
For RCE:
(1) ϕ→ ψ Assumption
(2) (ϕ > ϕ)→ (ϕ > ψ) (1), RCK
(3) ϕ > ϕ ID
(4) ϕ > ψ (2), (3), PC
For RCEA:
(1) ϕ↔ ψ Assumption
(2) ϕ→ ψ, ψ → ϕ (1), PC
(3) (ϕ > ϕ)→ (ϕ > ψ), (ψ > ψ)→ (ψ > ϕ) (2), RCK
8
(4) ϕ > ϕ, ψ > ψ ID
(5) ϕ > ψ, ψ > ϕ (3), (4), PC
(6) (ϕ > χ)↔ (ψ > χ) (5), CSO, PC
For RCEC:
(1) ϕ↔ ψ Assumption
(2) ϕ→ ψ, ψ → ϕ (1), PC
(3) (χ > ϕ)→ (χ > ψ), (χ > ψ)→ (χ > ϕ) (2), RCK
(4) (χ > ϕ)↔ (χ > ψ) (3), PC
From RCEA and RCEC, RE is obtained by a simple induction.
Then I prove that CA is derivable in Va. By DAE, it suffices to prove
(ϕ ∨ ψ > ϕ) ∨ (ϕ ∨ ψ > ψ)→ CA.4
(1) ϕ→ ϕ ∨ ψ, ψ → ϕ ∨ ψ PC
(2) ϕ > ϕ ∨ ψ, ψ > ϕ ∨ ψ (1), RCE
(3) (ϕ ∨ ψ > ϕ)→ ((ϕ > χ)→ (ϕ ∨ ψ > χ)) (2), CSO, PC
(4) (ϕ ∨ ψ > ψ)→ ((ψ > χ)→ (ϕ ∨ ψ > χ)) (2), CSO, PC
(5) (ϕ ∨ ψ > ϕ) ∨ (ϕ ∨ ψ > ψ)→ CA (3), (4), PC
Now I prove that MOD’ is derivable in Va.
(1) ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ→ ϕ ∧ ψ PC
(2) (¬ϕ > ϕ) ∧ (¬ϕ > ¬ϕ)→ (¬ϕ > ¬ϕ ∧ ψ) (1), RCK
(3) ¬ϕ > ¬ϕ ID
(4) ¬ϕ ∧ ψ → ¬ϕ PC
(5) ¬ϕ ∧ ψ > ¬ϕ (4), RCE
(6) (¬ϕ > ϕ)→ (¬ϕ ∧ ψ > ϕ) (2), (3), (5), CSO, PC
(7) ϕ ∧ ψ → ϕ PC
4This is of course not a proper notation. It is used to abbreviate the rather long formula
(scheme) (ϕ ∨ ψ > ϕ) ∨ (ϕ ∨ ψ > ψ) → ((ϕ > χ) ∧ (ψ > χ) → (ϕ ∨ ψ > χ)). I will use this
kind of abbreviation occasionally below. The abbreviated formulas should be easily recovered
from context.
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(8) ϕ ∧ ψ > ϕ (7), RCE
(9) (¬ϕ > ϕ)→ ((¬ϕ ∧ ψ) ∨ (ϕ ∧ ψ) > ϕ) (6), (8), CA, PC
(10) (¬ϕ ∧ ψ) ∨ (ϕ ∧ ψ)↔ ψ PC
(11) (¬ϕ > ϕ)→ (ψ > ϕ) (9), (10), RE
Next I prove that PIE is derivable in Va. It suffices to prove
(a) (ϕ ∧ ψ > χ)→ (ϕ > (ψ → χ)), and
(b) (ϕ > ¬ψ) ∨ ((ϕ > (ψ → χ))→ (ϕ ∧ ψ > χ))
For (a): Let α = (ϕ ∧ ψ) ∨ (ϕ ∧ ¬ψ)
(1) ϕ ∧ ¬ψ → ¬ψ ∨ χ PC
(2) ϕ ∧ ¬ψ > ¬ψ ∨ χ (1), RCE
(3) χ→ ¬ψ ∨ χ PC
(4) (ϕ ∧ ψ > χ)→ (ϕ ∧ ψ > ¬ψ ∨ χ) (3), RCK
(5) (ϕ ∧ ψ > ¬ψ ∨ χ) ∧ (ϕ ∧ ¬ψ > ¬ψ ∨ χ)→ (α > ¬ψ ∨ χ) CA
(6) (ϕ ∧ ψ > χ)→ (α > ¬ψ ∨ χ) (2), (4), (5), PC
(7) α↔ ϕ, ¬ψ ∨ χ↔ (ψ → χ) PC
(8) (ϕ ∧ ψ > χ)→ (ϕ > (ψ → χ)) (6), (7), RE
For (b): Let α = (ϕ ∧ ¬ψ) ∨ (ϕ ∧ ψ)
(1) (α > ϕ∧¬ψ)∨ (α > ϕ∧ψ)∨ ((α > (ψ → χ))→ (ϕ∧ψ > (ψ → χ)))DAE,
PC
(2) α↔ ϕ PC
(3) (ϕ > ϕ ∧ ¬ψ) ∨ (ϕ > ϕ ∧ ψ) ∨ ((ϕ > (ψ → χ))→ (ϕ ∧ ψ > (ψ → χ))) (1),
(2), RE
(4) ψ ∧ (ψ → χ)→ χ PC
(5) (ϕ ∧ ψ > ψ) ∧ (ϕ ∧ ψ > (ψ → χ))→ (ϕ ∧ ψ > χ) (4), RCK
(6) ϕ ∧ ψ > ψ PC, RCE
(7) (ϕ > ϕ ∧ ¬ψ) ∨ (ϕ > ϕ ∧ ψ) ∨ ((ϕ > (ψ → χ))→ (ϕ ∧ ψ > χ)) (3), (5),
(6), PC
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(8) (ϕ ∧ ψ) ∧ (ψ → χ)→ χ PC
(9) (ϕ>ϕ ∧ ψ)∧(ϕ>(ψ → χ))→(ϕ>χ) (8), RCK
(10) (ϕ > ϕ ∧ ψ) ∧ (ϕ > (ψ → χ))→ (ϕ ∧ ψ > χ) (6), (9), CSO
(11) ϕ ∧ ¬ψ → ¬ψ PC
(12) (ϕ > ϕ ∧ ¬ψ)→ (ϕ > ¬ψ) (11), RCK
(13) ¬(ϕ > ¬ψ)→ ¬(ϕ > ϕ ∧ ¬ψ) (12), PC
(14) ¬(ϕ > ¬ψ) ∧ ¬(ϕ > ϕ ∧ ψ) ∧ (ϕ > (ψ → χ))→ (ϕ ∧ ψ > χ) (7), (13), PC
(15) ¬(ϕ > ¬ψ) ∧ (ϕ > (ψ → χ))→ (ϕ ∧ ψ > χ) (10), (14), PC
(16) (ϕ > ¬ψ) ∨ ((ϕ > (ψ → χ))→ (ϕ ∧ ψ > χ)) (15), PC
This completes the proof of Va ⊇ Vb.
Now I prove Vb ⊇ Vc. The derivation of CC and CM is straightforward
using RCK. The rule RCEC is a special case of RE. It remains to show that
CA, CV, and CSO are derivable in Vb.
For CV:
(1) ¬(ϕ > ¬ψ) ∧ (ϕ > (ψ → χ))→ (ϕ ∧ ψ > χ) PIE, PC
(2) χ→ (ψ → χ) PC
(3) (ϕ > χ)→ (ϕ > (ψ → χ)) (2), RCK
(4) (ϕ > χ) ∧ ¬(ϕ > ¬ψ)→ (ϕ ∧ ψ > χ) (1), (3), PC
For CSO: Let α = ϕ > ¬ψ, β = ψ > ¬ϕ. By PC, it suffices to prove
(c) ¬α ∧ ¬β ∧ (ϕ > ψ) ∧ (ψ > ϕ)→ ((ϕ > χ)↔ (ψ > χ)),
(d) α ∧ (ϕ > ψ) ∧ (ψ > ϕ)→ ((ϕ > χ)↔ (ψ > χ)), and
(e) β ∧ (ϕ > ψ) ∧ (ψ > ϕ)→ ((ϕ > χ)↔ (ψ > χ)).
For (c):
(1) ¬α→ ((ϕ ∧ ψ > χ)↔ (ϕ > (ψ → χ))) PIE
(2) ψ ∧ (ψ → χ)→ χ PC
(3) (ϕ > ψ) ∧ (ϕ > (ψ → χ))→ (ϕ > χ) (2), RCK
(4) χ→ (ψ → χ) PC
11
(5) (ϕ > χ)→ (ϕ > (ψ → χ)) (4), RCK
(6) ¬α ∧ (ϕ > ψ)→ ((ϕ > χ)↔ (ϕ ∧ ψ > χ)) (1), (3), (5), PC
(7) ¬β ∧ (ψ > ϕ)→ ((ψ > χ)↔ (ϕ ∧ ψ > χ)) analogous to (1)–(6)
(8) ¬α ∧ ¬β ∧ (ϕ > ψ) ∧ (ψ > ϕ)→ ((ϕ > χ)↔ (ψ > χ)) (6), (7), PC
For (d):
(1) ¬ψ ∧ ψ → χ PC
(2) α ∧ (ϕ > ψ)→ (ϕ > χ) (1), RCK
(3) α ∧ (ϕ > ψ)→ (ϕ > ¬ϕ) (2), PC
(4) (ϕ > ¬ϕ)→ (ψ > ¬ϕ) MOD
(5) α ∧ (ϕ > ψ)→ (ψ > ¬ϕ) (3), (4), PC
(6) α ∧ (ϕ > ψ) ∧ (ψ > ϕ)→ (ψ > ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ) (5), RCK, PC
(7) ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ→ χ PC
(8) α ∧ (ϕ > ψ) ∧ (ψ > ϕ)→ (ψ > χ) (6), (7), RCK, PC
(9) α ∧ (ϕ > ψ) ∧ (ψ > ϕ)→ ((ϕ > χ)↔ (ψ > χ)) (2), (8), PC
Note that in the above derivation, I use MOD instead of MOD’, so that I can
dispense with RE. If MOD’ is used instead, then the derivation is longer, with
an additional line of transforming MOD’ to MOD, using RE.
(e) can be proved analogously to (d).
For CA: Let α = ϕ ∨ ψ > ¬ϕ, β = ϕ ∨ ψ > ¬ψ. It suffices to prove
(f) ¬α ∧ ¬β ∧ (ϕ > χ) ∧ (ψ > χ)→ (ϕ ∨ ψ > χ),
(g) α ∧ (ϕ > χ) ∧ (ψ > χ)→ (ϕ ∨ ψ > χ), and
(h) β ∧ (ϕ > χ) ∧ (ψ > χ)→ (ϕ ∨ ψ > χ).
For (f):
(1) ¬α ∧ ((ϕ ∨ ψ) ∧ ϕ > χ)→ (ϕ ∨ ψ > (ϕ→ χ)) PIE, PC
(2) (ϕ ∨ ψ) ∧ ϕ↔ ϕ PC
(3) ¬α ∧ (ϕ > χ)→ (ϕ ∨ ψ > (ϕ→ χ)) (1), (2), RE
(4) ¬β ∧ (ψ > χ)→ (ϕ ∨ ψ > (ψ → χ)) analogous to (1)–(3)
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(5) ϕ ∨ ψ > ϕ ∨ ψ ID
(6) (ϕ ∨ ψ) ∧ (ϕ→ χ) ∧ (ψ → χ)→ χ PC
(7) (ϕ ∨ ψ > (ϕ→ χ)) ∧ (ϕ ∨ χ > (ψ → χ))→ (ϕ ∨ ψ > χ)(5), (6), RCK, PC
(8) ¬α ∧ ¬β ∧ (ϕ > χ) ∧ (ψ > χ)→ (ϕ ∨ ψ > χ) (3), (4), (7), PC
For (g):
(1) (ϕ ∨ ψ) ∧ ¬ϕ→ ψ PC
(2) ϕ ∨ ψ > ϕ ∨ ψ ID
(3) α→ (ϕ ∨ ψ > ψ) (1), (2), RCK, PC
(4) ψ > ϕ ∨ ψ PC, RCK, ID
(5) α ∧ (ψ > χ)→ (ϕ ∨ ψ > χ) (3), (4), CSO
(6) α ∧ (ϕ > χ) ∧ (ψ > χ)→ (ϕ ∨ ψ > χ) (5), PC
(h) can be prove analogously to (g).
This completes the proof of Vb ⊇ Vc.
Corollary 4. VCc = VCa = VCb.
4 New Axiomatizations of Lewis’ Conditional Log-
ics
I propose the following new axiomatizations of Lewis’ conditional logics, which
are denoted by V′ and VC′, respectively.
V
′ = 〈PC, ID,CM,CA,CV,AC,RT;RCEC〉
VC
′ = 〈PC, ID,CM,CA,CV,AC,RT,CMP,CS;RCEC〉
Both systems replace the axiom CSO by the axioms AC and RT in Vc and
VCc, respectively. Meanwhile, CC is omitted, since it is derivable from other
axioms and rules. I will prove that the new axiomatizations are equivalent to
Lewis’ original ones. By Proposition 3 and Corollary 4, it suffices to prove that
V
′ is equivalent to Vc.
Proposition 5. V′ = Vc.
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Proof. First, I show that Vc ⊇ V′, i.e. AC and RT are derivable in Vc.
For AC:
(1) (ϕ > ϕ) ∧ (ϕ > ψ)→ (ϕ > ϕ ∧ ψ) CC
(2) ϕ > ϕ ID
(3) (ϕ > ψ)→ (ϕ > ϕ ∧ ψ) (1), (2), PC
(4) ϕ ∧ ψ → ϕ PC
(5) ϕ ∧ ψ > ϕ (4), RCE
(6) (ϕ > ψ)→ (ϕ > ϕ ∧ ψ) ∧ (ϕ ∧ ψ > ϕ) (3), (5), PC
(7) (ϕ > ϕ ∧ ψ) ∧ (ϕ ∧ ψ > ϕ)→ ((ϕ > χ)↔ (ϕ ∧ ψ > χ)) CSO
(8) (ϕ > ψ) ∧ (ϕ > χ)→ (ϕ ∧ ψ > χ) (6), (7), PC
For RT:
(1) ψ ∧ ϕ→ ϕ PC
(2) ψ ∧ ϕ > ϕ (1), RCE
(3) ϕ > ϕ ID
(4) (ϕ > ψ)→ (ϕ > ψ ∧ ϕ) (3), CC, PC
(5) (ϕ > ψ)→ (ϕ > ψ ∧ ϕ) ∧ (ψ ∧ ϕ > ϕ) (2), (4), PC
(6) (ϕ > ψ ∧ ϕ) ∧ (ψ ∧ ϕ > ϕ)→ ((ϕ > χ)↔ (ψ ∧ ϕ > χ)) CSO
(7) (ϕ > ψ) ∧ (ψ ∧ ϕ > χ)→ (ϕ > χ) (5), (6), PC
Then I show that V′ ⊇ Vc.
For CSO:
(1) (ϕ > ψ) ∧ (ϕ > χ)→ (ϕ ∧ ψ > χ) AC
(2) (ψ > ϕ) ∧ (ϕ ∧ ψ > χ)→ (ψ > χ) RT
(3) (ϕ > ψ) ∧ (ψ > ϕ) ∧ (ϕ > χ)→ (ψ > χ) (1), (2), PC
(4) (ϕ > ψ) ∧ (ψ > ϕ) ∧ (ψ > χ)→ (ϕ > χ) analogous to (1)–(3)
(5) (ϕ > ψ) ∧ (ψ > ϕ)→ ((ϕ > χ)↔ (ψ > χ)) (3), (4), PC
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To prove CC, note that we have proved that RCE can be obtained from PC, ID,
CM, and RCEC in the proof of Proposition 3. Since RCEA follows from RCE
and CSO, we also have RCEA in V′. Now we have the following derivation for
CC:
(1) ϕ ∧ ψ ∧ χ > ϕ ∧ ψ ∧ χ ID
(2) ϕ ∧ ψ ∧ χ > ψ ∧ χ (1), CM, PC
(3) ϕ ∧ ψ ∧ χ↔ χ ∧ ϕ ∧ ψ PC
(4) χ ∧ ϕ ∧ ψ > ψ ∧ χ (2), (3), RCEA, PC
(5) (ϕ > ψ) ∧ (ϕ > χ)→ (ϕ ∧ ψ > χ) AC
(6) (ϕ > ψ) ∧ (ϕ > χ)→ (ϕ ∧ ψ > ψ ∧ χ) (4), (5), RT, PC
(7) ϕ ∧ ψ ↔ ψ ∧ ϕ PC
(8) (ϕ ∧ ψ > ψ ∧ χ)→ (ψ ∧ ϕ > ψ ∧ χ) (7), RCEA
(9) (ϕ > ψ) ∧ (ψ ∧ ϕ > ψ ∧ χ)→ (ϕ > ψ ∧ χ) RT
(10) (ϕ > ψ) ∧ (ϕ > χ)→ (ϕ > ψ ∧ χ) (6), (8), (9), PC
Corollary 6. VC′ = VCc.
The axiom CSO was criticized by Gabbay (1972). One may be inclined
to abandon it directly. However, the above new systems show that CSO can
be recovered from AC and RT. It should be easy to notice that AC and RT
correspond to cautious monotonicity and cautious cut (a.k.a. cumulative tran-
sitivity) in nonmonotonic logics. Both cautious monotonicity and cautious cut
are regarded as the minimal requirements for nonmonotonic consequences. If
AC and RT are also taken to be minimal for conditional logics, then the above
proof shows that CSO is inevitable in conditional logics. If CSO is inevitable,
then RCEA is also inevitable, since it follows from CSO and another very mod-
est axiom CM. The new axiomatization indicates that it is difficult to construct
nonclassical conditional logics for characterizing default conditionals. It also
leads us to a puzzle about the controversial axiom SDA, which is the converse
of CA.
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5 A Resolution of a Puzzle about SDA
The axiom SDA suggests that conditionals with disjunctive antecedents have
conjunctive reading. For example, when I say that if John or Mary comes to
my party, I’ll be happy, it is reasonable to conclude that if John comes to my
party I’ll be happy, and if Mary comes to my party I’ll be happy. But if SDA is
contained in any conditional logic with the rule RCEA, the so called fallacy of
strengthening the antecedent which is rejected in all conditional logics will be
recovered. This can be shown by the following simple derivation:
(1) ϕ↔ (ϕ ∨ (ϕ ∧ ψ)) PC
(2) (ϕ ∨ (ϕ ∧ ψ) > χ)→ ϕ ∧ ψ > χ SDA, PC
(3) (ϕ > χ)→ (ϕ ∧ ψ > χ) (1), (2), RCEA, PC
There are mainly three approaches to solving this puzzle. The first approach,
adopted in (Loewer, 1976; McKay & van Inwagen, 1977; Nute, 1980a; Lewis,
1977), is to abandon SDA and apply something other than logic such as trans-
lation lore to account for the intuitive validity of SDA. The second approach,
adopted in (Nute, 1975, 1978, 1980b), is to keep SDA while giving up the rule
RCEA by developing nonclassical conditional logics. As we have seen in Sec-
tion 4, this means that some other intuitively reasonable axioms such as AC
or RT have to be abandoned too. In (Fine, 1975), both the first two ap-
proaches were suggested. The third approach, adopted in (Alonso-Ovalle, 2006;
Klinedinst, 2007; Paoli, 2012), is to give nonclassical interpretations for dis-
junction, so that the disjunctive antecedents in conditionals have conjunctive
reading. All the approaches are somewhat ad hoc, in the sense that condition-
als with disjunctive antecedents are treated as special and different from other
conditionals.
It has been noticed that SDA has counterexamples in both counterfactual
and indicative conditionals. The following is one for counterfactuals given in
(McKay & van Inwagen, 1977):
(1) If Spain fought on the Axis side or fought on the Allied side, it would fight
on the Axis side.
(2) If Spain fought on the Allied side, it would fight on the Axis side.
By SDA, (1) implies (2). But obviously (2) is false even if (1) is true. A sim-
ilar counterexample for indicative conditionals was given in (Carlstrom & Hill,
1978):
(3) If Ivan is playing tennis or playing baseball, then he is playing baseball.
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(4) If Ivan is playing tennis, then he is playing baseball.
By SDA, (3) implies (4). But we can have (3) true and (4) false. Both coun-
terexamples have the following form: ϕ∨ψ > ϕ is true but ψ > ϕ false. As far as
I know, no other forms of counterexamples of SDA have been discovered. Con-
sidering that SDA has only counterexamples of such special forms, one can not
resist keeping SDA while explaining away such counterexamples by attributing
them as abnormal uses of conditionals with disjunctive antecedents. But we still
face the conflict between SDA and RCEA. Remarkably, one of Lewis’ axioms
for conditional logics, namely the old-fashioned axiom DAE, which has been
neglected for a long time, can perfectly account for both the intuitive validity of
SDA and its counterexamples! The axiom DAE says that either ϕ∨ψ > ϕ is true,
or ϕ∨ψ > ψ is true, or (ϕ∨ψ > χ) is logically equivalent to (ϕ > χ)∧ (ψ > χ).
From DAE it follows that
¬(ϕ ∨ ψ > ϕ) ∧ ¬(ϕ ∨ ψ > ψ)→ SDA,
which is weaker than SDA. But it is not too weak, since as long as we exclude
the cases when the disjunctive antecedent conditionally implies one of its dis-
juncts, which are exactly the counterexamples for SDA we have found, SDA is
obtained. I think this resolution of the puzzle around SDA is better than previ-
ous ones, since we can dispense with any special treatments of the conditionals
with disjunctive antecedents. It is a big surprise that Lewis himself did not dis-
cover this simple solution, even though he had published a note (Lewis, 1977)
about SDA some years after he proposed the axiom DAE in (Lewis, 1971).
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